Abstract

In the United States, a growing share of Taiwan-born immigrants identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This paper investigates the rise of Taiwanese identity between 1990 and 2000 through cohort analysis. We pay particular attention to the duration of U.S. residence and examine how different birth cohorts and immigrant cohorts have fared, while controlling for acculturation, English proficiency, educational attainment, socioeconomic status, and residential context. Results show that Taiwanese identity is strongest in older cohorts and recent arrivals, while the growing awareness is most evident among younger cohorts. Although Taiwan-borns who have a higher level of education and socioeconomic status are more prone to Taiwanese identity, assimilation leads to a lower propensity. Large geographic variations exist. Taiwanese are not residentially separated from other ethnic Chinese by their identity. For Taiwan-born immigrants, Taiwanese appears to be a “rebellious” identity and a symbolic expression of solidarity with their compatriots back home, powered by growing Taiwanese nationalism.
One recent scandal illustrates the complexity of ethnic identity among Taiwan immigrants in the United States. Nuclear physicist Wen Ho Lee was arrested by the FBI and held for nine months in solitary confinement for allegedly spying for mainland China. The accusation of the Taiwan-born naturalized U.S. citizen was later found unsubstantiated. In response to reporters’ questions, then President Clinton repudiated the idea that the harsh treatment of Lee was related to his ethnicity. He further commented that pretrial detention is a serious matter “…not just for Chinese Americans, but for all Americans...” (Clinton 2000). However, the widely publicized “Chinese spying scandal” may be a misnomer, since the majority of Taiwan-born immigrants at Lee’s age do not consider themselves as Chinese. An even larger percentage did not report “Chinese” as their ancestry or ethnic origin in the 2000 census. Perhaps, the drama would not have been as sensational as if it was called “Taiwanese spying scandal.”

While the exact meaning of Taiwanese is debatable, there has been a surge in the Taiwanese identity among Taiwan-born immigrants in the United States. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of people reporting Taiwanese as their race/ethnicity in the U.S. Census increased by more than 60 percent. While continued immigration from Taiwan is attributable to the rise, another important factor is the growth in the number of Taiwan immigrants who embraced a new Taiwanese identity apart from ethnic Chinese. The trend is closely tied to Taiwan's growing democracy and growing nationalism, reflecting the dynamic characteristics of self-identification.
The rising Taiwanese identity presents an important test for the United States, which has vowed to protect Taiwan if mainland China were to invade (Sutter 2002). Taiwan immigrants in the U.S. are socioeconomically well off and many have maintained close ties with both Taiwan and mainland China. They are likely to have significant influences on the U.S. involvement in the potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, since diasporic communities in the U.S. have traditionally been proactive and instrumental in the independence movement in their country of origin (Shain 1994). It is also important to study the emergence of Taiwanese identity so as to have a better understanding of the complexity of the Chinese immigrants.

Although scholars in both Taiwan and the United States have well studied the rising Taiwanese consciousness in Taiwan (e.g., Baum and Sherry 1999; Liu and Ho 1999; Marsh 2002), much less documented are Taiwan immigrants in the United States and how they have shifted their identity. This study focuses on Taiwan immigrants and examines the extent to which the socioeconomic and demographic correlates are associated with their identity shift. This article has three main goals. The first goal is to evaluate Taiwan-born immigrants’ racial/ethnic identification choices and investigates the relative importance of factors in their racial label preference. The second goal is to assess the role of assimilation in the identity change. The third objective is to examine the importance of contextual factors in the identity formation.

In this article, we argue that identity is multi-dimensional; it is manifested as an integrative outcome of various dimensions. That is, the attributes of each
dimension are primordial, while their relative strength is situational. Under different circumstances, an individual may have multiple identities or various combinations of dimensions. As a result, there is no clear boundary between national identity and ethnic identity. While assimilation diminishes the strength of ethnic identity, globalization has greatly shrunk the distance between host and origin countries and worked against assimilation. The rise of Taiwanese identity is to protest against mainland China rather than to create a boundary to separate Taiwanese immigrants from other ethnic Chinese. As a “rebellious” identity, Taiwanese identity is particularly malleable and dependent on the tensions in the Taiwan Strait and on the political environment in the United States.

We use a data files extracted from the 5-percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 and 2000 censuses to track both birth cohorts and immigrant cohorts, treating identity shift as a temporal process influenced by multiple forces. This analysis follows a cohort approach, which was found highly useable in the study of social changes (Lieberson 1965; Ryder 1965; Carliner 2000; Myers 2004). More specifically, the analysis uses a double cohort approach proposed by Myers and Lee (1996; 1998) for the study of immigrants’ adaptation over time. The major advantage of the method is to separate aging from the immigration duration dimensions. Instead of interpreting cross-sectional data longitudinally, we measure temporal effects on identity switch. In doing so, we are able to measure the extent to which the events across Taiwan Strait in the 1990s have differential effects on the identity of various Taiwan immigrant groups in the United States. With information
about Taiwan immigrants and their residential districts matched at the most detailed level available in PUMS, we take into account explanatory variables at three levels: the individual characteristics, the household characteristics, and the locale’s ethnic compositions.

**Background**

*The 1990s – Rapid Changes across the Taiwan Strait*

Taiwanese identity is influenced by the cross-Strait relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, which is one of the most contentious and potentially explosive issues in East Asia. The mainland government considers the Taiwan issue as an internal affair and links it to the country’s humiliating colonial past. Therefore, they are deeply sensitive to the involvement of Western and Japanese powers in Taiwan (Hughes 1997). Fearing that the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia could happen in China, the mainland government regards Taiwan’s independence movement a crucial threat to its legitimacy and survival (Zhao 1999).

The 1990s was a remarkable period for the cross-Strait relationship, which experienced drastic changes after the end of the Cold War. While economic relations have rapidly improved, political relation has severely strained (Rigger 1997; Marsh 2000). The independence movement in Taiwan has gained considerable momentum. In response, the mainland government explicitly threatened to use force should Taiwan declare independence (Yu 1999). Mainland China also conducted missile tests and war games off Taiwan's coast prior to Taiwan’s first direct presidential
elections in 1996 (Chu 1996). However, the heavy hand may have backfired, since the hostility created a common enemy in the public opinion of Taiwan (Chu and Lin 2001). The opposition pro-independence party (DPP) took advantage of the situation, linked mainland China with imperial power, and painted the ruling GMD (Guomindang or the Nationalist Party) as a sympathizer of the mainland government. The DPP was successful and eventually took power in the 2000 presidential election, effectively ending five decades of control by the GMD (Wang 2000).

**Growing Taiwanese Identity in Taiwan**

Identity is also one of the most sensitive issues in Taiwan, straddling the fault line between the Mainlanders — minority elites who took power in the late 1940s — and the larger native-Taiwanese population with a growing sentiment toward Taiwan self-determination (Meisner 1963; Wachman 1994; Phillips 2003). After retreating to Taiwan, the GMD government had monopolized political power in Taiwan, proclaimed itself to be the sole legitimate government of China, and suppressed Taiwanese identity (Tu 1996; Baum and Sherry 1999).

The termination of martial law in 1987 signaled the start of the end of an era of authoritarian rule, giving the people of Taiwan more freedom to participate in national politics and to express their identity. The independence movement has

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1 The general make up of the Taiwan population is Aborigines (Yuanzhumin) (1.7%), Hoklo (73.3%), Hakka (12%) and Mainlanders (Waishengren) (13%) (Corcuff 2002; Huang 2002). The conceptual boundary of native-Taiwanese is not well defined. For many, native-Taiwanese are loosely referred to Hoklo and Hakka or those who speak the Minnan or Hakka language.
promoted a cultural agenda of de-sinicization and used the identity issue as a tool of political mobilization. In the late 1990s, then-President Li Deng-hui\(^2\) promoted a new Taiwanese identity to unify different native-Taiwanese factions and to bridge\(^3\) the traditional fault lines between native-Taiwanese (Benshengren) and the minority Mainlanders (Waishengren) (Baum and Sherry 1999; Lin and Tedards 2002; Brown 2004). Compared with the traditional meaning of Taiwanese, the new Taiwanese identity is more encompassing and inclusive, emphasizing “a sense of shared destiny” rather than ethnic differences (Chu 1996; Corcuff 2002).

The promotion of the new Taiwanese identity is very controversial, because Li Deng-hui as the then Chairman of the ruling GMD was supposed to support the “One China” policy rather than to promote a separate identity. His efforts agitated many Mainlanders in Taiwan who are the largest constituency of the GMD. Subsequently, the GMD was split and defeated in the 2000 presidential election. In addition, Li’s pro-independence stance and provocative activities have greatly alarmed the mainland government, thereby leading to the deterioration of the cross-Strait relations (Lin and Tedards 2002). But Li’s strategy is effective and the new Taiwanese identity has galvanized wide support form the general public in Taiwan. Survey shows that the share of Taiwan residents having Chinese identity has declined sharply in the 1990s, while the share of respondents identified themselves

\(^2\) Li Deng-hui was the first native Taiwanese to be selected the leader of then ruling party GMD, even though the GMD in general represented the interests of the Mainlander minority.

\(^3\) Whether the effort is to bridge differences or to create new rifts is dependent on different political viewpoints.
as Taiwanese has more than doubled to nearly 41.5 percent in 2002 (Liu and Ho 1999).

The growth of Taiwanese identity is far from accidental. First, identity-based nationalism is a powerful weapon for independence (Bell 1975). After the Cold War, people in many nations have become more assertive in their group distinctiveness and identity. The growing Taiwanese identity is part of the rising tide. Second, heightened tension across the Taiwan Strait enhances the wills of self-determination among Taiwan people. Third, apart from the growing nationalism, minority elites from mainland China have gradually lost political power in Taiwan. Fourth, the older generation who came from mainland China in the late 1940s is dying off. Meanwhile, the younger generation has little personal contact with the mainland, even if their parents came from mainland China in the 1940s. Fifth, there are large gaps between Taiwan and mainland China in terms of political freedom and economic development. Social and cultural experience rather than ancestry may dictate the identity of Taiwan people (Brown 2004).

**Taiwan Immigrants in the United States**

Immigrants in the United States are not immune from the identity politics in their country of origin (Shain 1994). The growth in Taiwan immigrants who regard themselves as Taiwanese was 40 percentage points higher than the growth rate of Taiwan-born population in the 1990s. More than 30 percent of 300,000 Taiwan immigrants in the United States took effort to write in Taiwanese as their race/ethnicity in 2000. However, the rise of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan
immigrants is in contrast to the peaceful coexistence with other ethnic Chinese
groups in the United States. The two groups do not appear to be at odd, as a result of
the separate Taiwanese identity.

So, are there major differences between the peoples of Taiwan and mainland
China? Given the large variations within the Chinese population, there are little
differences with respect to physical traits, social norms, and religious practices. The
differences are minimal when compared with the peoples in places such as Northern
Ireland, Cyprus, and Israel and Palestine. Even Koo Chen-fu, a Taiwan official who
was in charge of Straits Exchange Foundation, admitted that there are little ethnic or
cultural differences between the two sides (Rigger 1999). However, language can be
a dividing factor between the two groups. Although the written forms of the
languages are similar, the spoken forms can be different. Chinese immigrants
mostly speak Mandarin or other Chinese dialects, while native-Taiwanese primarily
use Minnan or Hakka—two Chinese dialects also widely used in Fujian province on
the mainland (Wachman 1994). However, in the forty-year period when the GMD
was in power, schools in Taiwan only taught Mandarin Chinese and the government
discouraged languages other than Mandarin in official occasions (Shih 1997).
Therefore, most people in Taiwan are able to communicate with their mainland
counterparts.

There are large differences in terms of socioeconomic status and educational
attainment between Taiwan and mainland Chinese immigrants. First, Chinese
immigrants are polarized at both the affluent and poverty ends of the socioeconomic
spectrum, while most Taiwan immigrants are well off. Second, the two groups had
different social and historical experiences, which lead to their different opinions
about the status of Taiwan. While mainland Chinese immigrants seem to be
ambivalent about the idea of Taiwan independence, a large number of Taiwan
immigrants support the notion of self-determination. Third, Taiwan immigrants may
have felt politically powerless and unable to have significant impacts on the cross-
Strait relations. In addition, the 1990s saw a large increase in the number of
immigrants from mainland China. A small potion of them might have come to the
United States undocumented. These factors combined together may have rendered
“Chinese” a less appealing category. Therefore, Taiwan immigrants may have used
Taiwanese identity to distinguish themselves from the rest of ethnic Chinese in the
United States and to protest against the policy of mainland China.

The Literature

Racial and Ethnic Identity – Primordialist vs. Social Constructionist

Cerulo (1997) provides a detailed review of the literature on identity
formation. Early researchers believed biological differences or physical attributes
separated humans into different groups, such as tribes or races (Stephan and
Stephan 2000). The term “ethnicity” gained traction in the mid to late 20th century
(Greeley 1974; Glazer and Moynihan 1975). Ethnic identity is used to set group
boundary, gain group consciousness, and distinguish from others. Compared with
race, ethnicity seems to emphasize more on social divisions than on biological or physical differences (Yinger 1985).

In the past 40 years, our understanding about the formation of ethnicity has also changed. Early dominant theories tended to view ethnicity as essentially “primordial affinity and attachments” and stress the permanence of ethnic and racial boundaries. Ethnicity was portrayed as inherited attributes that leave little room for individual choice (Geertz 1963; Isaacs 1975). In contrast, contemporary theoretical formulations highlight the socially constructed nature of ethnicity (Barth 1969; Gans 1979; Waters 1990). Ethnicity is situational, negotiated, and adaptable (Nagata 1974; Okamura 1981; Eschbach and Gomez 1998). The surge in Taiwanese identity seems to echo this point.

The distinction between primordialists and constructionists may not be as sharp as it seems (Smith 1991). Ethnicity is constructed upon primordial ties, such as links based on blood, kinship, culture, language, religion, and social practices. Such ties are later re-narrated and re-imagined to create variations of identity. The reformulations of ethnic identity can take place rather quickly in societies undergoing transformation. For individuals, the identity change occurs when they are in different social settings or migrate to a different society. In this case, the formation of ethnicity is a process of identifying emergent group interests rather than simply the manifestation of primordial sentiments.
Identity as Political Empowerment

There are a number of studies on changing racial/ethnic identity, particularly among minority groups in the United States. For traditionally oppressed groups, changing identity is related to how the group members view themselves and the roles of the structural factors such as institutional discrimination and racial segregation (Brown 1999). The changes in racial label preference among Blacks are to protest against racial discrimination and to gain respect from the white majority (Martin 1991; Smith 1992). There are large variations in identity preferences where are dependent on age, socioeconomic status, education, and exposure to black media.

Nagel (1995) examines “ethnic renewal” among American Indians from 1960 and 1990. She attributes the ethnic switching from “non-Indian” to “Indian” as a phenomenon influenced by political factors. Nagel argues that ethnicity is socially constructed and changing sociopolitical environment has encouraged an ethnic renewal. Yinger (1983; 1985) shows that social or political conflicts are likely to generate renewed attention toward ancestry and ethnic identity. The feelings of alienation strengthen identity and the will of self-determination. Barth (1969) highlights the role of ethnicity in resource competition and political mobilization. Identity is based on differences or otherness through which “self” is defined. As a result, ethnic identity relies on antagonism and confrontation.

Empirical research has revealed that, for Chinese diaspora, different situations lead to the varied outcomes of ethnic identity and assimilation in the host counties (Patterson 1975). Wang (1991) further shows the complexity and the
dynamic nature of the identity of Chinese diaspora. Their identity formation is intrinsically connected with historical context, constantly undergoing transformation, subject to factors such as race relations in host country, public policy toward China, China’s attitude toward overseas Chinese. Given the perilous condition of Chinese immigrants in the United States, their ethnic identity is particularly malleable and changeable by factors such as changing Sino-U.S. relations. As a result, the growing nationalism in Taiwan and the heighten tensions in the cross-Strait relations are manifested in Taiwanese immigrants in the United States.

Based on the theory, the rise of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan immigrants may have created a clear boundary to separate Taiwanese from the rest Chinese immigrants. Therefore, the literature indicates that possible factors in the rise of Taiwanese identity include growing antagonism between Taiwan and mainland Chinese immigrants and changing political environment in both the United States and Taiwan.

Conflicting Findings

There are conflicting findings regarding the formation of identity. On the one side, ethnic identity is associated with a working- and lower-class style. Minority and disadvantaged groups have a greater need to create new alliances to face off discrimination and advance the mutual interests (Alba 1990). Therefore, they are more likely to form distinctive identity to claim rights and privileges that are deprived by the majority group (Bell 1975). Meanwhile, upward mobility promotes assimilation and erodes the strength of identity. In this case, socioeconomic status
and assimilation are negatively associated with the consciousness of identity (Gans 1982).

On the other hand, research has found that people of higher educational attainment and socioeconomic status are more prone to express an identity (Lieberson 1985). While identity as a common cultural bond does not necessarily advance socioeconomic status of the well off, it provides opportunities for people who want to reconcile contradictory values (Waters 1990; Barth 2000). Furthermore, people of higher socioeconomic status may simply be more willing to declare their “symbolic identity” in surveys (Gans 1979; Farley 1991; Lieberson and Waters 1993). It is unclear which case better explains the emergence of Taiwanese identity.

Competing Forces in Taiwanese Identity

Two competing forces influence the rise of Taiwanese identity. One force is assimilation which should lower the strength of Taiwanese consciousness. As their duration in the U.S. extends, immigrants will have higher English proficiency and disperse from ethnic enclaves and from gateways where they initially settled (Gordon 1964; Waters 1994; Alba 1999). Alba (1990) shows that assimilated European decedents are less likely to be involved or interested in ethnic politics. In addition, they do not maintain ethnic language and participate in ethnic social or political organization, nor live in ethnic neighborhoods. Therefore, assimilated immigrants should be less interested in identity issue.
The force strengthening Taiwanese consciousness is the conflict between Taiwan and mainland China may, since it generates feelings of alienation among Taiwan-born immigrants (Yinger 1985). Globalization enhances such feelings by facilitating communication between immigrants and their country of origin. The effect of globalization may be particularly significant among Taiwan immigrants, because a large number of them are transnationals and have close ties with Taiwan and mainland China (McKeown 1997; Wang and Wang 1998; Tseng 2002; Ma and Cartier 2003). The interplay of the two competing forces is a major determinant in the rise of Taiwanese identity.

*Identity between Generations*

While the identity literature has focused on the second or third generation, relatively little attention has been directed to the first generation of immigrants. First generation immigrants have become increasingly important, because they have grown rapidly in the United States. The foreign-born size of the total population has increased by 3 percentage points in the 1990s to 11 percent in the year 2000.

In addition, Massey (1995) argues that historical pattern of assimilation may not repeat, because of the continuous replenishment of new immigrants to the United States. New arrivals are likely to reinforce the ethnic identity and connect the immigrant groups with their country of origin. Massey further suggests that the structural condition has changed. America has become a country more tolerant to differences. Whether the new arrivals will follow the traditional pattern of assimilation is going to have long lasting implications to the host society.
Data and Methods

The analysis will be carried out with Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data for the U.S. between 1990 and 2000. The PUMS data is arguably the most comprehensive public data source in the United States by which small groups such as Taiwanese immigrants can be specifically investigated. We focus on those who were born in Taiwan and subsequently immigrate to the United States. The sample is pooled between 1990 and 2000 census data, which is limited to those aged between 15-65 in 1990 and 25-75 in 2000.

Outcome variable

The primary outcome variable in this study is Taiwanese identity, referring to those who wrote in Taiwanese rather than chose Chinese as their race entry on the census form. With respect to the questionnaire design, the write-in options appear to be consistent between the 1990 and 2000 censuses. In both years, people had the option to choose "Other Asian and Pacific Islanders", and print their race/ethnicity in the boxes given. People have to take extra effort if they write in their identity. Therefore, those who wrote Taiwanese as their race in the census questionnaire should have strong affinity with the Taiwanese identity\(^4\). (See Appendix 1 for the

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\(^4\) In addition to the written in race/ethnicity, people also have the option to write in their ancestry or ethnic origin in the open-ended question of the census long form. There are inconsistencies in the responses among whites, who are the second or third generation of immigrants (Farley 1991; Lieberson and Waters 1993). However, first generation of immigrants should provide be more consistent in their answers. Ryder (1955) reveals large fluctuations in reporting racial/ethnic origins in the Canadian censuses. He discovers a significant association between the status German-Canada relations and the number of people who claim ethnic German. More specially, the period during the two world wars saw a huge decline in the number of people who reported their ethnic origins as Germany during the two world wars Canadian census. Such fluctuation reflects the relative "attractiveness" of the racial category. We need to keep these factors in mind when interpreting the results. In addition, a significantly higher share of Taiwan-born
census questions on race and birthplace in both 1990 and 2000). For the first time in history, the 2000 Census allows for more than one race identification. We categorize those who both wrote Taiwanese and marked Chinese as Taiwanese. In our sample, about 2.6% of the observations in 2000 fall into this case.

We have to keep in mind that we have limited knowledge on whether one is a Mainlander (Benshengren) descent or a native-Taiwanese (Waishengren) descent. Research has shown that, among Taiwan immigrants, Mainlanders outnumbered native-Taiwanese\(^5\) in the 1960s and 1970s. A growing number of native-Taiwanese came to the United States in the 1980s and 1990s (Chen 1992). Our limitation of the sample to Taiwan-bon immigrants helps mitigate the concern. The samples all have a primordial connection which is their birthplace. Then there comes the question of whether ethnic Chinese immigrants have different propensities to write in Taiwan as their birthplace. To check this issue, we track both birth and immigrant cohorts and examine the share of all ethnic Chinese (including Taiwanese) who wrote in Taiwan as their birthplace. Except for new immigrants (arrived in the 1980s) who saw a moderate decline of two to four percentage points, the share is rather consistent between 1990 and 2000. In other words, people seem to have reported their birthplace rather consistently over time.

\(^5\) Most Mainlanders were born in mainland China and not included in the sample.
Model

Our analytical strategy consists of three steps. First, we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. Second, we use logistic regression to estimate a model of Taiwanese identity with only temporal variables to assess identity shift. Third, we ascertain the net overall effects of the explanatory variables on Taiwanese identity.

For Taiwanese identity, we will fit double cohort longitudinal models that separate the cohort effect from the duration effect (from 1990 to 2000). Modeling procedures follow those described in Myers and colleagues (Myers and Lee 1996; Myers and Cranford 1998). The “double cohort” model nest birth cohorts within immigrant cohorts and trace changes between two time points. The advantage of this method is the ability to capture inter-period changes for specific birth and immigrant cohorts. The models estimated for this paper can be described as:

\[
(O) = \text{Year} + \text{BC} + \text{MC} + (\text{Year} \times \text{BC}) + (\text{Year} \times \text{MC}) + (\text{BC} \times \text{MC}) + \mathbf{X}
\]

where:

- (O) = Taiwanese as race/ethnicity (yes = 1 and no = 0),
- Year = census year (1990 = 0 and 2000 = 1),
- BC = age, or birth cohort, coded in 1990 as 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, or 65-74, and with each cohort 10 years older in 2000 (reference group = 35-44 in 1990, 45-54 in 2000),
- MC = immigration duration or year of arrival, coded as 1980s arrivals, 1970s arrivals, and arrived before 1970 (reference group = 1980s arrivals),
- (BC x MC) = joint immigrant cohort (duration effect) and birth cohort (aging) effect, and
- X = a vector of covariates (poverty status, education, English, and other).
Age: Age is an especially important dimension of identity awareness, because it is pertinent to the environment in which people grew up. The age differences have cohort continuity from one decade to the next, because initial characteristics are carried forward as the cohort ages to the next age group.

Generational effects may be pronounced in Taiwan-born immigrants, since a common set of historical experiences coincides with generational status. Prior to 1947, Taiwan was under the colonial control of Japan. During the subsequent 40-year authoritarian rule by the GMD, education was largely focused on mainland China. Native culture was suppressed. Taiwanese language was virtually banned in the media. The government forbad the official use of the term “Taiwanese” to describe the people in Taiwan. Instead, people were taught to use Chinese as both nationality and ethnicity (Baum and Sherry 1999). In private, however, many native-Taiwanese particularly among older generations have deliberately maintained their separate identity (Meisner 1963).

There are competing theories regarding the likelihood of young people to change their identity. On the one hand, younger generation may be more “rebellious” regarding their identity and more likely to challenge their given identity (Ryder 1965). In this case, for those who were given the “Chinese” identity, they may be more likely to switch to Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, young immigrants are more “forgetful” about their primordial ties with Taiwan and become less interested in ethnic politics, which will lower their likelihood of being identified as Taiwanese. In any case, age should be a key factor in the formation of
Taiwanese identity. It is expected that both young and old Taiwan immigrants are more likely to choose Taiwanese as their label.

The age range of this study is 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000. Five birth cohorts are constructed across time, namely those who were aged 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64 in 1990. Most Taiwan immigrants in the sample arrived in the U.S. before the termination of the martial law in 1987. The political transformation in Taiwan has only indirect influence on their identity.

**Duration of U.S. residence:** The central variable for measuring the assimilation effect on immigrants has been the length of time since immigration. Over time, immigrants should become more assimilated and less involved with identity politics in their country of origin. Therefore, earlier arrivals should be less prone to Taiwanese identity.

Duration of U.S. residence is also connected with the year of arrival to the U.S. or the time when Taiwan immigrants left Taiwan. Each immigrant cohort has idiosyncratic historical experiences, such as Taiwanese nationalism and cross-Strait tension. Successive cohorts are differentiated by their distinctive experiences with respect to the changing immigration policy and the socioeconomic conditions when they left Taiwan. In contrast to earlier Taiwanese immigrants who are mostly “human capital” immigrants, recent Taiwanese immigrants are more likely to be “capital-linked” investor immigrants. Moreover, Taiwanese nationalism did not gain
significant strength until the 1990s. The more recent Taiwanese immigrants are, the more likely they are influenced by the rising nationalism in Taiwan.

Under Duration, three arrival cohorts are studied across time, namely those who arrived to stay in the U.S. before 1970, 1970-1979, and 1980-1989. Although this variable has drawn some criticism for its measurement accuracy (Ellis and Wright 1998; Massey and Redstone 2003), we believe it continues to provide useful measurements. Because of the great distance between the United States and Taiwan, Taiwan immigrants are less susceptible to the problem of circular migration than Mexican immigrants. In addition, the rates of cohort attrition are reasonably low in Taiwan-born immigrants.

*English proficiency and use at home:* English proficiency measures the level of assimilation (e.g., Ryder 1955; Alba and Logan 1992). Assimilation of immigrants is aided by English proficiency, and this also impacts their willingness to locate away from ethnic enclaves. English proficiency may also connect with greater social distance from their country of origin. Moreover, English use in the home is a measure of acculturation, which may increase the distance from ethnic politics and additionally reduce the consciousness of Taiwanese identity.

*Human capital differences:* Educational attainment is the principal measure of human capital. As discussed, better educated might have greater awareness of Taiwanese identity. In addition, we include poverty status as an independent
variable. We code the poverty rate as a categorical variable based on the relative level of the poverty threshold. Those who have five times the poverty threshold are coded as pov1 or “low”; between three and five times as pov2 or “median low”; between poverty threshold and three times the poverty threshold as pov3 or “median high”; and below poverty threshold as pov4 or “high.” Once human capital is controlled, it is not clear how much differences will remain between birth cohorts and arrival cohorts.

Residential district: Geographic location is also an important factor in the formation of identity, relevant to access to ethnic community (Xie and Goyette 1997; Qian 2004). Immigrants who have dispersed from ethnic enclaves and moved away from gateways should be less involved in identity politics in their country of origin. Residential concentration helps maintain ethnic salience and hinder assimilation (Duncan and Lieberson 1959; Lieberson 1963). Therefore, the context in which immigrants adapt themselves is consequential to the outcomes of such adaptation (Portes and Zhou 1993).

We use three simple variables to measure the geographic locations of Taiwan immigrants. First, we use percent Taiwan-born immigrants in relation to the total population within each public use micro area (PUMA). Second, we informally test the relevance of mainland Chinese concentration by PUMA. Since Taiwan-born immigrants share similar residential areas with other Chinese, the two measures of

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Poverty status is a better measure than income, since the female labor force participation rate among Taiwan immigrants are lower than other Chinese groups. There are also variations in the cost of living and inflation over time. The poverty measure is adjusted for these factors.
ethnic concentration are highly correlated. Therefore, we code the mainland Chinese
collection as a set of categorical variables. PUMA is the smallest geographic unit
observable in the PUMS file. A PUMA is a large residential district with at least
100,000 residents, and this has been shown to be highly usable area despite its coarse

In addition, we control for metropolitan fixed effects in metropolitan areas
where there are largest Taiwan immigrant population. More specifically, we identify
Taiwan immigrants by their residential locations, which are Los Angeles CMSA,
New York CMSA, Washington DC CMSA, San Francisco CMSA, and places outside
the four metropolitan areas. Residents in these four metropolitan areas have better
access to ethnic media and culture. Therefore, it is expected that Taiwan immigrants
in the four metropolitan areas have stronger propensity to identify themselves as
Taiwanese.

Descriptive Findings

Table 1 shows that about 20 percent of all ethnic Chinese immigrants in the
U.S. were born in Taiwan. The proportion is relatively consistent between 1990 and
2000. Among those who were born in Taiwan, less than 60 percent wrote in
Taiwanese as their ancestry or ethnic origin. The numbers are also consistent
between 1990 and 2000. The third row of Table 1 indicates that the proportion of
Taiwan-born immigrants wrote in Taiwanese as their race increased by six
percentage points to almost 30 percent of the total in 2000. Place of birth seems to be
the most consistent indicator, while the responses to the write-in race have changed most significantly and reflected the different levels of affinity with Taiwanese identity. This seems also to confirm the hypothesis that racial identification of Taiwan immigrants is optional and multidimensional.

(Table 1 about here)

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of ethnic Chinese immigrants who were born in and out of Taiwan. Taiwan-born immigrants have a higher level of education. They also speak English better and have lower level of poverty than ethnic Chinese immigrants born out of Taiwan. Both groups increased their education level, socioeconomic status, and English proficiency between 1990 and 2000, but Taiwan immigrants saw a slightly larger improvement.

(Table 2 about here)

Table 3 presents the percentage of Taiwan-born immigrants who wrote in Taiwanese as their race between 1990 and 2000. There are large increases in Taiwanese identity across the board. However, there are large differences between birth cohorts, reflecting generational differences in Taiwanese identity. Those who came in age 25-34 (BC2) in 1990 have the lowest likelihood to write in Taiwanese as their race, while those who came in 45-54 (BC4) in 1990 are the most likely. The level of increase is also uneven. BC4 saw the largest increase, while BC1 had the smallest.

(Table 3 about here)
There are also large variations between immigrant cohorts, but the difference is smaller than that between birth cohorts. Early arrivals started with the highest level of Taiwanese identity, but they saw the smallest increase. This seems to show that the longer duration of U.S. residence leads to a smaller increase in Taiwanese identity. Also consistent with our hypothesis is the rise of Taiwanese identity is negatively associated with English proficiency. Those who speak English only had not only the lowest likelihood to write in Taiwanese, the rate of increase is also smallest in the three groups.

There are large differences across metropolitan areas. Taiwan immigrants are more likely to write in Taiwanese as their race if they live in Los Angeles. The propensity is lowest in San Francisco. Meanwhile, the role of socioeconomic status is less apparent. However, the bivariate results may be misleading because of the possible correlations between factors. In order disentangle the independent effects of all relevant factors, we conduct a multivariate analysis.

**Multivariate Results**

In Tables 4, we present estimated coefficients for three logit models, in which the dependent variable is whether a Taiwan-born immigrant wrote Taiwanese as their race (yes=1) in the two censuses. Models 1 and 2 include only temporal variables.

Let us look first at the models with no covariates. Overall, the results suggest that Taiwanese identity is highly stratified by cohorts. The oldest two birth cohorts
(BC4 and BC5) have the highest likelihood of being identified as Taiwanese, while immigrant cohort arrived in the 1970s (MC2) is least likely. In addition, there is a significant effect associated with census year, indicating that a large proportion of Taiwan-born immigrants switched from Chinese to Taiwanese over the period.

In model 2 of Table 4, we add age effect, duration effect, and joint immigrant cohort and birth cohort effects. A chi-square test (i.e. difference in model $\chi^2$ statistic) shows that the interactive model clearly improves over the baseline model, indicating that selected birth cohorts in specific immigrant cohorts have unique histories of identifying with Taiwanese or “age-at-immigration” effect. It also shows that birth cohorts and immigrants have progressed differently over time. The presence of the interaction terms ($Y \times BC$, $Y \times MC$, and $BC \times MC$) slightly increases the magnitude of the coefficient estimates and only reverses the sign of BC3.

The interpretation of age effect and duration effect has to be related to the reference group. Although all birth and immigrant cohorts have negative signs indicating they have smaller increase than the reference group, only the age effect of BC1 is statistically significant. In other words, the youngest birth cohort has the smallest increase in their likelihood of being identified as Taiwanese, despite their relatively high probabilities in the beginning of the period. This finding seems to show that immigrants are least likely to involve in ethnic politics if they arrived at young ages.
Adding the interaction term (BC x MC) reveals that the age-at-immigration effect is even stronger among older cohorts. The coefficients are progressively increased for the next two older cohorts, reflecting a consistent age-at-arrival effect between immigrant cohorts. In other words, the two older birth cohorts (BC4 and BC5) in both the 1970s (MC2) and the pre 1970s (MC3) immigrant cohorts are much more likely to identify themselves as Taiwanese than indicated by the additive effects of birth cohort and immigrant cohort. Given the presence of the interaction terms, the main effect of immigrant cohort applies only to the reference cohort, which is “ages 25-34 in 1990 who arrived in the 1980s.”

To address the question how much the differences in Taiwanese identity is associated with human capital and socioeconomic correlates, we add a set of covariates in model 3 of Table 4. Again, a chi-square test reveals that adding the covariates improves over model 2, indicating that the likelihood of being identified with Taiwanese varies between socioeconomic groups and across metropolitan areas. The inclusion of the covariates, however, has little impact on the coefficient estimates presented in model 2.

Human capital and socioeconomic factors are significantly associated with identity. Compared with the reference group7, Taiwan immigrants who have a 4-year college degree and live in Los Angeles are most likely to identify themselves with Taiwanese. In contrast, residing in San Francisco, speaking English only, and

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7 The reference group for immigrant cohort in 1990 is Taiwan-born immigrants came to the United States in the 1980s; for educational attainment it is "High school dip. w/ some college"; for English proficiency it is "speaks English not well or not at all"; for poverty, it is "low" or those below the poverty threshold; for metropolitan areas, it is outside the four metropolitan areas.
living five times above the poverty threshold lowers the probability. Meanwhile, a higher concentration of Taiwan-born immigrants is positively associated with the probabilities of Taiwanese identity. In other words, living in Taiwan-born immigrant communities reinforces Taiwanese identity, possibly due to better access to ethnic politics and media. This finding supports the assimilation perspective in that ethnic concentration slows assimilation, which leads to a stronger ethnic identity. We further conducted an informal test of the local concentration of the Chinese immigrants who were born in mainland China. While the result is not shown in the tables, it reveals that the clustering has little effect on Taiwan immigrants in their identity choice. This finding indicates that the rise of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan immigrants has little to do with ethnic Chinese from mainland China.

The pattern of effects is sufficiently complex that we evaluate them graphically. Figure 1 depicts the predicted probability of Taiwanese identification by the Taiwan-born immigrants’ birth and immigrant cohort, education, English proficiency, poverty status, and metropolitan areas while holding other variables at their sample means. The predicted probability is first calculated for each observation, averaged and then visually presented in Figure 1. The results are comparable to the descriptive statistics reported earlier in Table 3.

(Figure 1 about here)

It can be easily seen from Table 2 that the period effect (year) is overwhelming. Almost all groups increased the proportion to be identified as Taiwanese. There are also large differences. The variation is the largest across birth
cohorts. Young cohorts seem to start from a relatively low level and increase more slowly. In fact, BC1 or the youngest cohort saw a decline in their probabilities of identifying themselves as Taiwanese. The youngest cohort, who was likely to be educated in the U.S., seems to be particularly subject to the effect of assimilation and did not experience an increase in Taiwanese identity. In contrast, those who aged 45 and 54 in 1990 (BC4) started with the highest likelihood to be identified as Taiwanese and had further increases in the likelihood over the period. BC5 were born during the colonial time and Second World War, while BC4 were born during China’s domestic war between the Communist and the Nationalists (GMD) and immediately after GMD fled to Taiwan. The two birth cohorts of Taiwan immigrants may have the strongest memory of the authoritarian rules. More specifically, BC4 did not have any direct experience under Japanese colonial rule which may explain their highest level of Taiwanese identity.

There are also large differences between immigrant cohorts. Consistent with the assimilation perspective, new immigrants are more likely to identify themselves as Taiwanese. They also had large increase in their Taiwanese identity during the 1990s. Also consistent with the assimilation perspective is the finding that Taiwan immigrants who speak only English are least likely to identify themselves as Taiwanese. Meanwhile, socioeconomic status is a rather weak correlate. Interestingly, people of higher level of education are more likely to identity themselves as Taiwanese.
There are large differences across metropolitan areas. Los Angeles and San Francisco, two largest metropolitan areas for ethnic Chinese immigrants, experienced a drastically different level of Taiwanese identity. Meanwhile, Taiwan immigrants Washington DC and New York are almost the same as those live outside the four metropolitan areas in terms of the likelihood to be identified as Taiwanese.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has investigated the rise of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan-born immigrants in the United States, demonstrating how identity switching occurs within a complex temporal structure. The extent to which Taiwan immigrants change their racial identification is not only connected with the political events in their country of origin, but also embedded with their year of birth, year of arrival, and age at arrival. We also find that the rise of Taiwanese identity is subject to the interplay of multiple forces.

This study is couched in the extensive literature. To a great extent, the findings are consistent with the literature on ethnic identification among whites. That is, the racial identification of Taiwan-born immigrants is largely optional and situational. We also argued for the importance of primordial ties in racial identification. Our argument is well supported by the overwhelming period effect—a concerted increase in Taiwanese identity among almost all birth and immigrant cohorts. The shared birthplace seems to link all Taiwan immigrants in the identity shift. We also found that the percentage of Taiwanese identification varies mostly
from 15% to 45% across different demographic characteristics. In no demographic group is an overwhelming majority identified either as Taiwanese or Chinese.

Further support for the argument that racial identification is optional for Taiwan immigrants is the significant effect of assimilation on racial identification. For those who are acculturated or speak only English at home, they are slower to switch to Taiwanese identity. In addition, cohort analysis discloses significant variations in the trajectories of Taiwanese identity, showing a rapid rise among older cohorts and recent arrivals. Settled Taiwanese immigrants have lower probabilities to identity themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The duration effect works differently on young cohorts, who actually experienced a decline in the probabilities of Taiwanese identification. Moreover, Taiwan immigrants have a lower propensity of Taiwanese identification when they live outside Taiwan immigrant communities. These findings seem to show that assimilation blurs the boundary between Taiwanese and Chinese.

This research also contributes to the ethnicity literature. The traditional literature on ethnic identity has primarily focused on the extent to which minority groups accept or reject given identities. The story is largely oriented around the conflicts between the white majority and selected minority groups. In contrast, there is little apparent conflict between Taiwan immigrants and the white majority and between Taiwan immigrants and mainland China immigrants.
The rise of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan immigrants is pertinent to political empowerment and directly connected with the identity politics in Taiwan and the heightened tension across Taiwan Strait. As a result, the influence of assimilation and upward mobility is much weaker than the effect of political conflicts at immigrants’ country of origin. Even though the political conflicts occur in places far away, globalization has greatly reduced the distance between the origin and the host countries and greatly enhances the feelings of political alienation among Taiwan immigrants. Highly educated Taiwan immigrants have higher propensities to identify themselves as Taiwanese, which seems to confirm the facilitating effects of globalization. However, identity politics may quickly become irrelevant among immigrant children and second generation immigrants, because they no longer share strong primordial ties with Taiwan immigrants.

For Taiwan-born immigrants, Taiwanese appears to be a “rebellious” identity and a symbolic expression of nationalistic solidarity with their compatriots back home, influenced by growing Taiwanese nationalism and energized by heightened cross-Strait tension. Meanwhile, Taiwanese awareness is positively related to educational attainment which seems to show that Taiwanese identity is more symbolic than substantive; the rise of Taiwanese identity is not likely to advance the economic interest of Taiwan immigrants as a disadvantaged group. In addition, there are large geographical variations with respect to Taiwanese identification. The awareness is highest in Los Angeles area and lowest in San Francisco, although both metropolitan areas have large Chinese communities. While regional differences in
pol political mobilization and media coverage may have played a role, further research is clearly needed to better understand the large regional variations.

Further support the argument that Taiwanese is a “rebellious” identity is the fact that there are stark differences between birth cohorts and between immigrant cohorts. Taiwanese identity is strongest in older cohorts and recent arrivals, reflecting the strength of the primordial ties to Taiwan. Taiwan is much smaller and militarily weaker than mainland China. In the United States, Taiwan-born immigrants are also smaller in size than mainland Chinese. However, living with their mainland counterpart has little impact on the identity of Taiwan immigrants. Taiwan immigrants congregate with other ethnic Chinese.

What are the possible explanations for the rise of Taiwanese identity? Taiwan-born immigrants are an economically well-off group and “human capital” immigrants, considered by many as “model minority.” They are not likely to be the target of socioeconomic oppression in the United States. The emergence of Taiwanese identity seems to acknowledge the common attachment of Taiwanese to their birthplace. Taiwan-born immigrants emphasize Taiwanese identity as an affective tie to demonstrate against the government of the mainland China. The claim of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan immigrants may be a response to the large influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1990s, but it is not meant to create a boundary line separating Taiwan immigrants from other ethnic Chinese in the United States.
How is Taiwanese identity going to evolve in the future? No better case illustrates the complexity of Taiwanese identity in the U.S. than the “Chinese spy scandal.” The case shows the challenges of defining Taiwanese identity. Unlike Chinese, a well-defined ethnic group, Taiwanese is a socially constructed and politically contested identity (McKeown 1997). The Taiwanese identity is malleable and layered phenomenon that depends on the context. The formation is heavily influenced by the political climate in Taiwan and by the tensions between Taiwan and mainland China (Wachman 1994; Ng 1998). The rise of Taiwanese identity coincides with a time that there are little shared interests between mainland China and Taiwan. However, the shared interests between different groups of ethnic Chinese immigrants may supersede their differences. It is possible to form a pan ethnic Chinese group, promoting mutual interests of ethnic Chinese immigrants in the United States in case of another Wen Ho Lee style scandal (Okamoto 2003). In this case, people may interpret the term “Chinese” more broadly than people from China (Zhongguoren). Instead, Chinese may refer to a group of people who have a shared heritage and a mutual interest in the future (Huaren). Meanwhile, there is a concerted effect to transform the “rebellious” identity into a more permanent and exclusive one, which is based on different histories and imagined futures. This movement may counteract the need for the pan Chinese identity and the desire for a bigger political clout in their adopted country.
Reference:


Tu, Weiming. 1996. Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan (in Taiwan Today). *The China Quarterly* 148 (Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan):1115-1140.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Chinese Immigrants who were Born in Taiwan</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>(44,455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Taiwan-born Immigrants who Wrote in Taiwanese as their Ancestry or Ethnic origin</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>(10,143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Taiwan-born Immigrants who Wrote in Taiwanese as their Race</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>(10,143)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample are limited to ethnic Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants who were 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000, and arrived in the United States before 1990. Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations.
Source: Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000
Table 2. Selected Statuses of Chinese Immigrants by Place of Birth, 1990 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Taiwan 1990</th>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th></th>
<th>Outside Taiwan 1990</th>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational attainment</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low: High School Dropout (Educ1)</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median: High School Diploma and Some College (Educ2)</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High: 4-year College Degree (Educ3)</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English proficiency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Only (Engonly)</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well (Engwell)</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Well (Engnotwell)</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (pov4)</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median High (pov3)</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Low (pov2)</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (pov1)</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong># Observations</strong></td>
<td>10,143</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,386</td>
<td></td>
<td>34,312</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,647</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample are limited to ethnic Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants who were 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000, and arrived in the United States before 1990.
Table 3. Percentages of Taiwan-born immigrants who Identified as Taiwanese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth Cohort</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24 in 1990, 25-34 in 2000 (BC1)</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 in 1990, 35-44 in 2000 (BC2)</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 in 1990, 45-54 in 2000 (BC3)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54 in 1990, 55-64 in 2000 (BC4)</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 in 1990, 65-74 in 2000 (BC5)</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant Cohort</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980s (MC1)</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s (MC2)</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Before 1970 (MC3)</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High: 4-year College Degree</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median: High School Diploma and Some College</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low: High School Dropout</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Proficiency</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English Only</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Well</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (pov4)</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median High (pov3)</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Low (pov2)</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (pov1)</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan areas</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles CMSA</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco CMSA</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington DC CMSA</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York CMSA</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the four metropolitan areas</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Obs. 10,143 8,386

Note: Sample are limited to ethnic Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants who were 15-64 in 1990 and 25-74 in 2000, and arrived in the United States before 1990. Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations.

Source: Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000
Table 4. Logistic coefficients of Taiwanese identity among Taiwan-born immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.130 ***</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-1.635 ***</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>-2.362 ***</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year (1990 = 0; 2000 = 1)</td>
<td>0.384 ***</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.552 ***</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.513 ***</td>
<td>0.069</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth cohort (BC)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 in 1990, 25-34 in 2000 (BC1)</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.709 ***</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.784 ***</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 in 1990, 45-54 in 2000 (BC3)</td>
<td>-0.463 ***</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.404 ***</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.366 ***</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54 in 1990, 55-64 in 2000 (BC4)</td>
<td>0.999 ***</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>1.344 ***</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>1.269 ***</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 in 1990, 65-74 in 2000 (BC5)</td>
<td>0.814 ***</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>1.060 ***</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>1.011 ***</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant cohort (MC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s (MC2)</td>
<td>-0.380 ***</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>-0.550 ***</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>-0.554 ***</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1970 (MC3)</td>
<td>-0.135 *</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age effect with time (Y x BC)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 in 1990, 25-34 in 2000 (BC1)</td>
<td>-0.389 ***</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>-0.500 ***</td>
<td>0.110</td>
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<td>45-54 in 1990, 55-64 in 2000 (BC4)</td>
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<td>0.119</td>
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<td>Duration effect with time (Y x MC)</td>
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<td>Joint immigrant cohort and birth cohort effect (MC x BC)</td>
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<td>BC3</td>
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<td>BC4</td>
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<td>0.148</td>
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<td>BC5</td>
<td>0.756 ***</td>
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<td>BC4</td>
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<td>0.535 *</td>
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<td>4-year College Degree (Educ3)</td>
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<td>Speak English only</td>
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<td>Poverty level</td>
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<td>Median High (pov3)</td>
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<td>High (pov4)</td>
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<td>Local concentration of Taiwan-born immigrants</td>
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<td>Log (Percent Taiwan-born immigrants)</td>
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<td>Metropolitan areas</td>
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<td>Los Angeles CMSA</td>
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<td>San Francisco CMSA</td>
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<td>Washington DC CMSA</td>
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<td>0.093</td>
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<td>New York CMSA</td>
<td>-0.222 ***</td>
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</table>

Note: The reference group for birth cohort in 1990 is "25-34 in 1990 and 35-44 in 2000"; for duration effect, it is immigrants arrived in the 1980s; for age effect, it is "25-34 in 1990"; for age-at-arrival effect, the reference group is "ages 25-34"; for immigrant cohort in 1990 the reference group is Taiwan-born immigrants came to the United States in the 1980s; for educational attainment it is "High school dip. w/ college"; for English proficiency it is "speaks English not well or not at all"; for poverty, it is "low"; for metropolitan areas, it is outside the four metropolitan areas. The number of observation is 18,529.

Source: Census 5% PUMS, 1990 and 2000

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Taiwanese Identification among Taiwan-born Immigrants, 1990-2000

Note: Predicted probabilities control for birth cohort, immigrant cohort, education, poverty status, English proficiency, ethnic concentration, and metropolitan areas.
Appendix 1. Census questions on race and birthplace

### 1990

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Birthplace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ White</td>
<td>☐ In the United States — Print name of state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Black or Negro</td>
<td>☐ Outside the United States — Print name of foreign country, or Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Indian (Amer.) (Enter name of the enrolled or principal tribe)</td>
<td>☐ Name of State or foreign country, or Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Eskimo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Alaskan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Asian or Pacific Islander (API)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Chinese</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Filipino</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Hawaiian</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Korean</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Vietnamese</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Other API</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Other race (Print race)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2000

**What is this person's race?** Mark ☐ one or more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be.

- ☐ White
- ☐ Black, African Am., or Negro
- ☐ American Indian or Alaska Native — Print name of enrolled or principal tribe.

- ☐ Asian Indian
- ☐ Chinese
- ☐ Filipino
- ☐ Japanese
- ☐ Korean
- ☐ Vietnamese
- ☐ Other — Print race.

- ☐ Some other race — Print race.

**Where was this person born?**

- ☐ In the United States — Print name of state.

- ☐ Outside the United States — Print name of foreign country, or Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.